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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a theory of meta-argumentation, by using
Dung’s theory of abstract argumentation to reason about itself. Meta-
arguments are generated from atomic arguments, and extensions of acceptable
meta-arguments are based on Dung’s argumentation semantics. To illustrate
our theory, we show how to represent Toulmin schemes in this theory
by introducing meta-arguments using the Caminada labeling, and meta-
arguments for support.
1. Methodology
Usually, when people encounter that the abstract nature of
Dung’s argumentation theory makes it difficult to represent
an example of argumentation, their first inclination is to
extend Dung’s theory, for example with preferences among
arguments [1], second and higher-order attack relations [2],
[3], support relations among arguments [4], or priorities among
arguments. However, we propose to instantiate Dung’s theory
rather than to extend it.
In a sense, it may be argued that Dung and colleagues [5]
propose already to instantiate his theory rather than to ex-
tend it, and abstract arguments have been instantiated by,
for example, assumptions, default rules, or clauses from a
logic program. However, Dung’s framework is seen as an
abstract reference model into which less abstract models can
be mapped, but is not meant to be the ”starting point” of
a modeling activity. [5] refers to Dung’s framework as an
abstraction of logic programming semantics interpretation,
and the assumption-based approach proposed there is not
introduced as an instantiation of Dung’s framework but rather
as a sort of intermediate abstraction with respect to various
non-monotonic logics.
We instantiate Dung’s theory with meta-arguments, such
that we use Dung’s theory to reason about itself. E.g., one
may argue whether ‘don’t throw rubbish on the floor!’ counts
as an argument or not, whether it counts as an attack on ‘be
free!’, or whether it supports ‘respect other people!’, or which
argumentation semantics should be used. Or, one may argue
whether a coalition of the Left is preferred to one of the Right
or whether a larger coalition is preferred for getting more votes
despite being less stable.
In particular, for argument a, we introduce meta-arguments
a∈ and a/∈ of the Jacobovits - Vermeir - Caminada labeling,
representing whether the argument a is an element of the set
of acceptable arguments or not, which are used to represent
the Toulmin scheme [6]. Moreover, for arguments a, b and c,
we can add meta-arguments like a supports b,’ ‘a attacks b’,
‘c attacks the attack from a to b’, etc.
Our methodology is based on the idea that we take the
acceptable meta-arguments using some argumentation seman-
tics, filter out the atomic arguments like a∈ by removing
auxiliary arguments like a/∈, and then the set of atomic
arguments represents the acceptable arguments of the extended
theory. In the trivial cases where no additional information
is added, they will correspond to the acceptable arguments
using the same argumentation semantics used for the meta-
argumentation theory.
As an example of our methodology and its challenges, con-
sider a meta-argumentation framework with meta-arguments
a∈ and a/∈. Without further motivations, the most natural rep-
resentation may seem that they attack each other, which means
that neither of them will be in the grounded extension, and
there will be two preferred or stable extensions, one containing
a∈ and one containing a/∈. However, since there is no such
symmetry in the Jacobovits - Vermeir - Caminada labeling,
this intuition is flawed. More importantly, such a symmetric
attack relation would not give us any accepted arguments in
the grounded extension. The other symmetric alternative, of
not imposing any constraints on the attack relation between
the two arguments, would lead to the possibility where both
would be accepted, which is flawed as well. Thus we have to
demand that either all the in meta-arguments attack their out
counterparts or vice versa; we adopt the former approach.
As a more involved example, consider the addition of
attack arguments [7], [8],[9],[10]. In that case, the attack from
argument a to argument b is represented by adding an attack
meta-argument ‘a attacks b’ in between. This attack meta-
argument itself attacks meta-argument b∈, which represents
that if the attack meta-argument is accepted, we cannot have
that argument b is accepted. Moreover, if the attack meta-
argument is not accepted, because it is itself attacked, then
meta-argument b∈ can be accepted, and thus argument b can
be accepted. Now, how do we represent that if argument a (i.e.
meta-argument a∈) is not accepted, then we cannot have an
attack from a to b either? We cannot represent this by an attack
from meta-argument a∈ to the attack meta-argument, but we
represent it by an attack from the meta-argument a/∈ to the
attack meta-argument. This illustrates the essential role of out
meta-arguments in the representation of second or higher order
attacks.
2. An abstract theory of meta-argumentation
2.1. Abstract argumentation
We follow Baroni and Giacomin [11]. An underlying mech-
anism of argument generation defines a set of arguments,
which is typically infinite, and which we call the universe
of arguments and represent by U . An acceptance function E
is a function that associates with a set of arguments A ⊆ U ,
a set of arguments produced by a reasoner at a given instant
of time, and a binary relation →⊆ A × A, representing the
dominance or attack relation among these arguments, the sets
of acceptable arguments of A.
Definition 1: Let U be the universe of arguments. An ac-
ceptance function E : 2U × 2U×U → 22U is a partial function
which is defined for each argumentation framework 〈A,→〉
with finite A ⊆ U and →⊆ A × A, and which associates
with argumentation framework 〈A,→〉 sets of subsets of A:
E(〈A,→〉) ⊆ 2A.
Baroni and Giacomin identify two fundamental principles
underlying the definition of extension-based semantics in
Dung’s framework, the language independent principle and
the conflict free principle. See [11] for a discussion on these
principles.
The following definition summarizes the most widely used
acceptability semantics, that satisfy these two principles.
Which semantics is most appropriate depends on the appli-
cation domain of the argumentation theory.
Definition 2 (Acceptability semantics): Let AF = 〈A,→〉
be an argumentation framework. Let S ⊆ A. S defends a
if ∀b ∈ A such that b → a, ∃c ∈ S such that c → b. Let
D(S) = {a | S defends a}.
• S ∈ Eadmiss(AF ) iff cf(S) and S ⊆ D(S).
• S ∈ Ecompl(AF ) iff cf(S) and S = D(S).
• S ∈ Eground(AF ) iff S is smallest in Ecompl(AF ).
• S ∈ Epref(AF ) iff S is maximal in Eadmiss(AF ).
• S ∈ E skep-pref(AF ) iff S = ∩Epref(AF ).
• S ∈ Estable(AF ) iff cf(S) and∀b ∈ A\S∃a ∈ S : a→ b.
Jacobovits - Vermeir [12] and Caminada [13] show that
these semantics can also be described by a three valued
argument labeling, where the first two conditions represent
conflict free and defense, and the third one represents the so-
called reinstatement principle.
Proposition 1: Let L〈A,→ 〉admiss : A → {in, out, undecided}
be a complete labeling function for semantics satisfying the
conflict free principle such that:
1) L〈A,→ 〉admiss(b) = out iff ∃a→ b : L
〈A,→ 〉
admiss(a) = in
2) if L〈A,→ 〉admiss(b) = in then ∀a→ b : L
〈A,→ 〉
admiss(a) = out
and let L〈A,→ 〉compl : A → {in, out, undecided} be a complete
labeling function such that in addition:
3) if ∀a→ b : L〈A,→ 〉compl (a) = out then L
〈A,→ 〉
compl (b) = in.
Then we have the following results.
Eadmiss(AF ) = {{a | L〈A,→〉admiss(a) = in} | ∃L
〈A,→ 〉
admiss}
Ecompl(AF ) = {{a | L〈A,→〉compl(a) = in} | ∃L
〈A,→ 〉
compl }
They show how the other semantics can be defined in terms of
these labelings too. Actually, our way of defining admissible
labellings is mix of the work of Jacobovits & Vermeir and
Caminada’s work. The differences:
• In the work of Jacobovits & Vermeir, there are only two
labels: in (”+”) and out (”-”), but an argument can get 0,
1 or 2 labels. This basically destroys the correspondence
with Dung’s extension based approach.
• In Caminada’s work [13] a weaker condition is used
to describe admissible labellings (condition 1 is ”if ...
then ...” instead of ”iff”). The stronger condition in our
work causes each admissible set to have exactly one
admissible labelling, whereas in Caminada’s description,
an admissible set can have one or more associated ad-
missible labellings (so there’s a 1-n relation instead of a
1-1 relation like in our work).
Clearly, one of the advantages is the fact that there is now
an 1-1 relation with admissible sets. The disadvantage is
that the stronger condition is perhaps too strong for some
purposes, and that for instance the discussion game for pre-
ferred semantics does yield ”weakly” (Caminada version) but
not ”strongly” (our version) admissible labellings. Also the
preferred/stable/semi-stable algorithm of [13] yields labellings
that are weakly admissible but not strongly admissible, so
they could not directly be applied to our version of admissible
labellings.
2.2. Representation theory
Our theory of meta-argumentation can be seen as a special
kind of representation, namely as representation by an argu-
mentation theory where the set of arguments is extended. It is
based on the following three steps.
1) Extend the set of arguments with auxiliary arguments;
we call the extended set ‘meta-arguments’.
2) Calculate the extensions of the extended theory us-
ing one of Dung’s semantics; we call them ‘meta-
extensions’.
3) For each meta-extension, filter out the auxiliary argu-
ments; the resulting sets of arguments are the extensions
of the theory.
The three-step process terminates by filtering out auxiliary
arguments and producing a set of extensions. The difference
with respect to the set of extensions one would produce
without using the three-step process involving meta-arguments
is that we can represent more complex structures formerly
introduced in the literature as extensions of Dung’s framework.
To define a particular meta-argumentation framework, we have
to define how the set of meta-arguments is generated from the
set of atomic arguments, and which conditions argumentation
frameworks have to satisfy, i.e., for which argumentation
frameworks the acceptance function is defined.
3. Toulmin scheme in abstract argumentation
3.1. Toulmin scheme
Loui [14] finds that Toulmin is ninth in total number of
citations for philosophers of science and logic between 1988
and 2004. He concludes that after paradigm shifts and methods
(Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend), fuzzy logic (Zadeh), illocution-
ary force (Austin), the analytic-synthetic distinction (Quine),
supervenience (Putnam), deductive-nomological explanation
(Hempel), Toulmin’s scheme must be mentioned next, before,
for example, Carnap, Church, Tarski and Russell-Whitehead.
Hitchcock and Verhey [15] explain Toulmin’s scheme in
Figure 1 as follows.
D So Q, C 
D for Data 
Q for Qualifier 
C for Claim 
W for Warrant 
B for Backing 
R for Rebuttal 
Unless R Since W 
On account of B 
Fig. 1. Toulmin scheme [Toulmin, 1958, p.108].
“First we assert something, and thus make a claim. Chal-
lenged to defend out claim by a questioner who asks, “What
have you got to go on?”, we appeal to the relevant facts at our
disposal, which Toulmin calls our data (D). It may turn out
to be necessary to establish the correctness of these facts by a
preliminary argument. But their acceptance by the challenger,
whether immediate or indirect, does not necessarily end the
defense. For the challenger may ask about the bearing of our
data on our claim: “How did you get there?” Our response
will be at our most perspicuous take the form: “Data such
as D entitle one to draw conclusions, or make claims, such
as C.” [6, p.98]. A proposition of this form Toulmin calls a
warrant (W). Warrants, he notes, confer different degrees of
force on the conclusions that justify, which may be signaled
by qualifying our conclusion with a qualifier (Q) such as
“necessarily”, “probably” or “presumably”. In the latter case,
we may need to mention conditions of rebuttal (R) “indicating
circumstances in which the authority of the warrant would
have to be set aside” [6, p.110]. Our task, however, is still
not necessarily finished. For our challenger may question
the general acceptability of our warrant: “Why do you think
that?” Toulmin calls our answer to this question our backing
(B).” He emphasizes the great differences in kind between
backings in different fields. Warrants can be defended by
appeal to a system of taxonomic classification, to a statute,
to statistics from census, and so forth. It is this difference in
backing that constitutes the field-dependence of our standards
of argument. Ultimately, all micro-arguments depend of the
combination of data and backing. In rare cases, checking the
backing will involve checking the claim; Toulmin calls such
arguments “analytic arguments”. Most arguments are not of
this sort, so that purely formal criteria do not suffice for
their assessment; Toulmin calls them “substantial arguments”.
The sort of backing that is acceptable for a given substantial
argument will depend on the field to which it belongs.”
There are various challenges to formalize Toulmin’s field-
independent scheme. First, the scheme, like Dung’s argumen-
tation theory, differs radically from the traditional logical anal-
ysis of a micro-argument into premises and conclusion, and
it was precisely this difference that has made the scheme so
popular and influential. However, Toulmin’s argument against
formalization of his scheme can be countered by the argument
that over the past five decades, many new kinds of formalisms
have been developed. The second challenge is that there are
great differences between the kind of backings in different
fields, as emphasized by Toulmin, and thus backing B is
abstract like arguments in Dung’s theory. The third challenge,
which is the challenge of this paper, is to represent the defense
of C by D. Extensions of Dung’s theory with a binary support
relation among arguments [4] do not allow for the support
itself to be attacked [3], which is the core of Toulmin’s scheme.
3.2. Jakobovits - Vermeir - Caminada labeling
Figure 2 visualizes our representation of Toulmin’s scheme
in abstract argumentation. Each square is a meta-argument,
stating that the argument inside the square is in, and each
circle is a meta-argument stating that the argument written
inside it is out (neither is undecided). The qualifier Q is
not represented, and rebuttal is represented by an optional
counterargument R to C. If we have D∈ and B∈ then we
have W∈ and accordingly C∈ for any of Dung’s argumentation
semantics. If we don’t have B∈, then we don’t have W∈, and
consequently we don’t have C∈. In the bottom left corner of
the figure, we suggest a more convenient visualization. We add
C/∈ and R/∈ for symmetry and to combine micro-arguments,
but for a single micro-argument we could have left them out.
D∈ W∈ C∈
B∈
D∉ W∉
B∉
D W C
RB
R∈
C∉
R∉
Legenda
Abbreviation
In 
Argument
Out 
Argument
Attack
Fig. 2. Toulmin scheme in abstract argumentation.
One may wonder whether there are other representations of
Toulmin’s scheme in our meta argumentation framework. For
example, at first sight it may seem that if there is an attack
from D∈ to D/∈, then there might also be an attack the other
way around. However, this would not represent the defense of
C by D, but a conditional defense: if D would be acceptable,
then C would be acceptable too. However, we do not claim
that our representation is the only one which can be used, and
a more systematic exploration of the kind of schemes which
can be represented in our meta-argumentation theory is a topic
of further investigation.
Figure 3 visualizes some examples of combining micro-
arguments into larger arguments [16]. This is one contribution
of Dung’s theory since it talks about larger networks, and
offers the distinction between various kinds of semantics to
deal with cycles, and it is well known that without cycles all
Dung’s semantics coincide. An example of cycle is provided
on the bottom left of Figure 3. For example, there can be
attacks on data D too as in the example provided on the bottom
right of Figure 3 where the two data D and E attack each other.
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Fig. 3. Combining micro-arguments.
The generation of meta-arguments and the condition on
meta-argumentation frameworks are thus very simple, and
formalized as follows.
Definition 3: Let A0 be a set of atomic arguments. Let
the universe of arguments U of a Toulmin argumentation
framework be the minimal set of arguments such that if a in
A0, then a∈ and a/∈ in U . A Toulmin argumentation framework
is an argumentation framework 〈A,→〉, where a∈ in A iff a/∈
in A, and if a∈ in A, then a∈ → a/∈, and this is the only
attack on a/∈.
Toulmin does not consider examples with cycles, so the
formalization of his examples is straightforward (and all
semantics coincide). A topic for further exploration concerns
the effect of adding the meta-arguments is: how are the original
semantics related to the semantics of the extended framework?
How to define the influence from meta-arguments to original
arguments, e.g. argument b should be out if meta-argument b/∈
is in?
4. Concluding remarks
We show how Dung’s abstract argumentation theory can
reason about itself, using the Jakobovits - Vermeir - Caminada
labeling to say whether an argument is acceptable or not; we
call it a theory of meta-argumentation. In particular, we show
how to represent the Toulmin scheme from informal argu-
mentation by representing the defense of a claim by its data
as a warrant argument, which can be attacked, and defended
itself by a backing argument. Whereas many generalizations of
Dung’s abstract argumentation theory are now being proposed,
leading to a fragmentation of the area, our aim in this paper
is to represent such extensions as instances of Dung’s theory.
A further validation of our meta-argumentation approach is
therefore the representation in our theory of other proposed
extensions as well as existing instances of Dung’s theory,
such as his assumption based argumentation. A particular
promising topic of further research is the use of collective
meta-arguments. For example, whereas for Toulmin a claim
C is defended by data D, for Dung an argument is defended
by a set of arguments, such that we need collective arguments
to represent meta-arguments about Dung’s notion of defense.
Moreover, whereas in the approach advocated in this paper
each extension of meta-arguments corresponds to an extension
of arguments, with collective meta-arguments we can represent
multiple extensions into a single meta-extenson.
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